China's 13th Five-Year Plan: A Draft Proposal by Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik
_________________________________________________________________________97
__________________________________________________ China's 13th Five-Year Plan
China's 13th Five-Year Plan:  
A Draft Proposal
KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD
Despite over 35 years of reform, some things in China never change. 
Thus, regular Five-Year Plans are still being formulated to serve as 
guidelines for the leadership's economic development policy priorities. 
The ﬁrst Five-Year Plan was released in 1953 and only during the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60) was the planning process suspended. Since 
the 1950s, overall planning has been conducted under the direction of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP deﬁnes the goals to be 
reached and the guidelines to be followed. These are outlined in a draft 
document, which is formally conﬁrmed at a subsequent spring meeting 
of the National People's Congress (NPC). In the period between the 
passing of the draft at a meeting of the CCP's central committee and 
the meeting of the NPC, there may be adjustments and concretizations, 
but these will not result in major changes.  
The ﬁrst Five-Year Plan emphasized heavy-industrial development, 
and this trend continued through subsequent plans. By way of high 
investment rates and the price-scissors, which channeled resources from 
agriculture to industry, Chinese planners built an oversized heavy-
industrial complex (Brødsgaard and Rutten 2015). Even after the deci-
sion was made to begin a new phase of reform and open door policies, 
the old pattern of pouring resources into heavy industry continued to 
dominate and investment kept increasing to reach record high levels 
of almost 50 per cent of GDP.
New Development Model
The 12th Five-Year plan, covering the period 2011-2015, was the ﬁrst to 
seriously attempt a change of the economic development model from 
lopsided focus on heavy industry to a more balanced and coordinated 
development of the main sectors of the economy (Brødsgaard 2011). 
Development priorities shifted to a strategy characterized by green 
development and a higher focus on social welfare or 'the people's 
wellbeing'. Key concepts and formulations were the 'scientiﬁc develop-
ment concept' and 'taking the people as the foundation'. It was the ﬁnal 
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Five-Year Plan of the era of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, laying down a 
course which they hoped the new leadership under Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang would follow.  
Proposals for the 13th Five-Year Plan were discussed and reviewed 
during the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, 
which convened in Beijing from 26-29 October 2015 (Xinhua 2015c). A 
ﬁnal plan will be ratiﬁed by the annual session of the National People's 
Congress in March 2016. However, barring major political change, the 
policies objectives and priorities of the plan will not be changed. 
The new Five-Year Plan comes at a crucial time, when China's eco-
nomic growth is slowing down. In 2014 the economy grew 7.4 per cent 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2015), compared to an average annual 
economic growth rate of 9.9 per cent during the previous 35 years. This 
year economic growth has slowed further and in the third quarter of 
2015, the growth rate dropped to 6.9 per cent (Yin 2015), the ﬁrst time 
the quarterly growth rate has dropped below 7 per cent since the global 
ﬁnancial crisis in 2009. However, since the economy expanded at an an-
nual rate of 8 per cent between 2011 and 2014, the target of an average 
annual growth of 7 per cent will without doubt be fulﬁlled.
Chinese leaders have characterized the shift from previous high-growth 
to a medium-to-high speed growth as China's 'new normal'. This is a new 
buzzword in current economic discussion in China, and it is also provides 
the key to understanding the thinking behind the new Five-Year Plan. The 
'new normal' scenario does not envisage a planned ﬁxed economic growth 
rate. However, the plan stipulates that the goal is to double Chinese GDP 
between 2010 and 2020. Based on current economic circumstances this 
will involve an annual growth rate of at least 6.5 per cent for the rest of 
the decade.  In the past Chinese leaders continuously strove to surpass 
planned growth targets. However, this time around all indications are 
that the focus will instead be shifted to balanced development and the 
quality of economic growth, with industrial upgrading, innovation and 
green development at the centre. This also involves developing the service 
sector, promoting agricultural modernization, alleviating poverty, and 
building eco-friendly production and consumption modes. 
Environment
China has replaced the USA as the manufacturing hub of the world. A 
quick look at the latest available statistical communiqué of Chinas eco-
nomic indicators shows the enormous manufacturing capabilities of the 
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country (National Bureau of Statistics 2015). Last year China produced 2.1 
trillion tons of coal, 822 million tons of steel, 24 billion tons of cement, 141 
million TV sets, 13 million passenger cars, 87 million household refrigera-
tors, 1.6 billion mobile telephones and 350 million micro-computers.  This 
position as the factory of the world has come with huge environmental 
costs. During the winter season many of the big cities in North and North-
east China regularly experience air pollution that exceeds hazard levels 
by 10 to 15 times. The country now has by far surpassed the USA as the 
top CO2 emitter in the world (Wübbeke and Conrad 2015). 
The Chinese government has realized that pollution now is so serious 
that it poses critical health risks. At the annual session of the National 
People's Congress in March 2014, Prime Minister Li Keqiang declared 
war on pollution and since then a number of measures have been intro-
duced with the ambition of creating a so-called ecological civilization. 
In May 2015 the State Council issued a national strategy to promote 
eco-civilization, listing 10 major goals including reduction of pollutant 
emissions. Thus by 2020 carbon dioxide emission will be reduced by 40 
to 45 per cent from 2005 levels (Yin 2015). 
Local state environmental bureaus have until recently been under-
staffed and functioning under the jurisdiction of local governments. 
They will now be better staffed and strengthened in terms of rank in 
order to withstand pressure from local ofﬁcials who focus their atten-
tion solely on economic development. Perhaps even more importantly, 
government ofﬁcials will in the future be held responsible for pollution 
beyond their terms of ofﬁce.  Already in the 12th Five-Year Plan envi-
ronmental concern was mentioned as one of the key indicators when 
evaluating the performance of local ofﬁcials.
Section V of the draft Five-Year Plan is devoted to green develop-
ment, showing the focus on improving the 'ecological environment'. It 
stipulates that the government 'will support green and clean production, 
promote green transformation of traditional manufacturing, advance 
green and low-carbon industrial system of circular development, and 
encourage the upgrading and renovation of techniques, technology, 
and equipment of enterprises' (Xinhua 2015c: 14). In order to co- ﬁnance 
green development a Green Development Fund will be established.
Innovation and quality
The draft Five-Year Plan stresses not only that industrial production 
should be based on environmental concerns, it should also be innova-
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tion-driven and efﬁcient in terms of the allocation of production factors 
like labour, capital, land, technology and management (Section III). In 
an attempt to foster new engines of development, it is the intention to 
promote the leading role of city clusters, including the integrated de-
velopment of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, the Yangtze River Delta and 
the Pearl River Delta. In addition city clusters will be formed in north-
eastern China, central China, the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, 
the Chengdu-Chongqing area and the Guangzhong Plain. 
Realizing that China is still weak in research and development as well 
as innovation, the draft plan stipulates that China will promote a group 
of national key scientiﬁc and technological programmes. The goal is to 
make breakthroughs in the development of core technologies in ﬁelds 
such as 'next-generation information communications, new energy, new 
material, aerospace, biology, medicine, and intelligent manufacturing' 
(Xinhua 2015c: 7).
The draft extends plans for quality, efﬁciency and innovation to the 
agricultural sector. It states that the government will push for agricul-
tural modernization that is 'high-efﬁcient, resource-conserving and 
environmentally-friendly and features safe products' (Xinhua 2015c: 7). 
Concerning agricultural product quality the draft plan emphasizes the 
necessity to institute a safety supervision system that covers the whole 
process from farmland to dining table. 
SOE reform
The need for SOE reform has been widely discussed in China as well 
as abroad. The comprehensive reform program adopted at the 3rd Ple-
nary Session of the Central Committee in November 2013 advocated 
substantial SOE reform based on the overall principle of upholding 
the market as 'the decisive force' (Xinhua 2013). The draft Five-Year 
Plan only brieﬂy touches on the decisive role of the market in resource 
allocation and has little to say on SOE reform. It mentions that private 
enterprises will be encouraged to enter more sectors and that non-
state-owned capital will be introduced into the reform of state-owned 
enterprises, but at the same time it states that China will 'endeavor to 
make state-owned enterprises stronger, better, and bigger, so that they 
can better serve the national strategic goals' (Xinhua 2015c: 9).  In short, 
on the one hand the leadership wishes to introduce more competition 
in the state-owned sector, on the other hand an attempt will be made 
to create even stronger and bigger enterprises.  This seems to involve 
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contradictory policies. Chinese planners argue that in order to be able 
to compete on the global-level playing ﬁeld, Chinese companies need to 
merge with other companies in their sector in order to be large enough 
to cope with the competition from western multinationals.  How this 
can be implemented without creating even bigger monopolies in the 
home economy remains a mystery.
In relation to external economic relations the draft plan has a para-
graph on RMB convertibility. The Chinese government will strive to 
achieve this goal and will also promote the RMB to be added to the basket 
of currencies used to value the SDR, a reserve currency created by the 
IMF in 1969. If approved RMB will be included in the SDR basket from 
1 October 2016 (Orlik and Chen 2015). China will also work to establish 
more bilateral investment treaties and advance the 'one belt, one road 
initiative', the construction of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries (Xinhua 
2015c: 18). All these initiatives will clearly advance China's inﬂuence in 
the international economic system and has the potential of creating an 
alternative to the US-dominated Breton Woods system.
It is noteworthy that the draft plan also addresses the Taiwan issue 
and stipulates that 'we should uphold the “1992 Consensus” and the 
one-China principle and stick to the belief that two sides of the Taiwan 
straits belong to one family' (Xinhua 2015c: 18). One week after the 
Central Committee concluded its session, Xi Jinping met in Singapore 
with Taiwan's president, Ma Yingjiu.  There is no ofﬁcial indication that 
the CCP Central Committee discussed the Taiwan issue. Apparently Xi 
Jinping took this initiative after consulting with very few people in the 
senior leadership.
Public service
Section VII is about enhancing the 'wellbeing of the people'.  This involves 
increasing and improving the supply of public service. In order to real-
ize this objective, the intention is to outsource public service to social 
undertakings (shetuan).  In fact it is stipulated that 'if the government can 
purchase the service, it will not directly offer the service itself' (Xinhua 
2015c: 20).  Already reforms along these lines have been conducted in 
Guangdong province and now the government plans to extend the experi-
ment to the whole country. If implemented it will in fact hollow out the 
government's welfare obligations and open the door to further privatiza-
tion of public service (health care, elderly care, education) in China.
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In sector VII it is also stipulated that the government will implement 
a policy of 'one couple with two babies at most'. This indicates an end to 
the one-child policy and is the greatest change in China's family planning 
in three and a half decades. The decision aim to create a balanced popu-
lation development and solve the aging population problem.  However 
the reform is unlikely to make a big change in the trend of population 
growth. Many couples in the city are not likely to have more than one 
child and, even if they did, it would take a long time to reverse the trend 
of declining population. Therefore, in the short- to medium term China 
will still face serious population challenges, including a steady decline 
in the work-age population.
Inequality
In recent years income gaps have widened in China. This has to a certain 
extent been a deliberate policy on the part of the government.  But some 
business executives have had pay packages amounting to several mil-
lion RMB. In some cases business leaders have earned salaries several 
hundred times the average pay of their own employees (Brødsgaard 
2015). The development of the private economy has also contributed 
to rising income inequalities. China now has more billionaires than the 
US. It is estimated that the total assets of the super-rich have soared to 
31 trillion RMB, equal to 10 times the GDP of Norway and 20 times that 
of the Philippines (China Daily 2015).
The new Five-Year Plan stipulates that 'the income gap should be 
narrowed, with the proportion of people with middle income increased' 
(Xinhua 2015c: 4).  The overall goal is that 'the average income of urban 
and rural residents should be double those of 2010'. Poverty alleviation 
is also part of the programme. The goal is to lift 70 million people above 
the poverty line by 2020. This is the group of poor people who live below 
the national poverty line of 2,300 RMB in annual income. 
Corruption
Section VIII of the draft plan is about the need to strengthen the Party's 
capacity to provide leadership for the realization of the 13th Five-Year 
Plan. Party leadership and institutional strengthening have been a cen-
tral issue for the leadership since Xi Jinping took over as Party leader in 
November 2012. A wide range of Party documents, concerning issues 
such as selecting and appointing Party leaders (People's Daily 2015), 
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establishing Party groups (dangzu) in all government agencies and or-
ganizations as well as in private companies and NGOs (Xinhua 2015a), 
and about training and re-education, have been circulated. 
Strengthening the Party's governing capacity involves upholding the 
principle of clean government.  A few days before the plenary session, 
the Central Committee issued new rules on clean government and sanc-
tions for those ofﬁcials who violate the Party's code of conduct (Xinhua 
2015b). They are the latest regulations circulated in a widespread anti-
corruption and anti-graft campaign that has been going on since late 
2013. During the campaign more than 100 ofﬁcials at ministerial level and 
above have been brought down, including two former vice chairmen of 
the Central Military Commission, generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong 
as well as former head of China's security apparatus and member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee, Zhou Yongkang. At lower levels tens of 
thousands of cadres have been detained and investigated. The campaign 
shows no sign of stopping and its continuation seems to deﬁne the 'new 
normal' in Chinese politics. In terms of elite politics the campaign has 
strengthened Xi Jinping and his close ally Wang Qishan, who together 
with another member of the Politburo Standing Committee Yu Zheng-
sheng, dominate the top policy-making organs in the Party.
Conclusion
The building of a so-called 'moderately afﬂuent society in a compre-
hensive manner by 2020' is the ﬁrst centenary goal set by the CCP. The 
second centenary goal is to establish a 'modern socialist country' by 
2049, when the People's Republic of China marks its centennial. Future 
Five-Year Plans will be prepared under the guidance of this goal.
The new Five-Year Plan, to be implemented from 1 January 2016, will 
be the ﬁrst to have been formulated according to China's 'new normal'. 
The economic growth rate is expected to slow down around 6.5 per cent. 
Although this is a signiﬁcantly reduced growth rate compared to the 
hyper growth of the past 35 years, it is high enough to double the Chinese 
GDP from 2010 to 2020. China's GDP has already surpassed the US' in 
terms of purchasing power parities. By 2020 the size of China's economy 
will most likely have reached that of the US in nominal terms.
However, proposals for the new Five-Year Plan indicate that the shift 
to a more balanced economic development process already embedded 
in the current 12th Five-Year Plan will deepen. This involves focus on 
green and innovation-driven development, upgrading of the industrial 
104 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(2)•2015
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard _______________________________________________________
structure and output, increasing the contribution of consumption to 
economic growth and reducing the role of investment, raising people's 
living standards and quality of life, eliminating remnants of rural pov-
erty, advancing environmental protection and modernizing the national 
governance system. In order to ensure that Party and state ofﬁcials fol-
low the line and do not engage in corrupt and wasteful practices, the 
current anti-corruption campaign will continue.
Chinese Five-Year Plans read like a catalogue of ideas and abstract 
work assignments. Analysis and reﬂection are absent and western schol-
ars often wonder whether they serve any practical purpose. As they 
now contain fewer concrete quantitative goals than in the past, they do 
not serve as a concrete to-do list determining the actual mobilization 
and allocation of material resources. However, this does not mean that 
they are insigniﬁcant. All China's 31 provinces most work out similar 
plans, translating national guidelines into local realities. This will involve 
major planning work for provincial bureaucracies. Moreover, although 
central planning in a quantitative sense is less rigorous than in the past, 
Five-Year Plans are still important as they serve as guidelines to the 
economic thinking of the CCP and state leaders. They must therefore 
be carefully studied.
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